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CRITICAL ANALYSIS: PORTUGUESE 9
TH
 GRADE EXAM RESULTS AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
FACTORS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The typical indicator used to assess school performance is average test score results. 
Literature has pointed out serious weaknesses of this measure as a school performance indicator. 
The strongest criticism resides in the bias that may exist in socially disadvantaged schools. In fact, 
this measure does not take into account socioeconomic and other variables which are relevant in 
determining student‟s school performance and out of the scope of school control. Using school 
level cross-section data from Portugal for 9
th
 grade exams between 2005 and 2010, I have 
explicitly calculated the impact of these variables on school achievement as regards exams. I found 
an important causal effect between socioeconomic variables and school achievement. This implies 
that average test scores are an intrinsically flawed instrument. For this reason, this study proposes 
an adjusted measure of school performance. This measure consists of a ratio between current 
average school scores and expected average school scores, taking into account the reference 
variables by municipality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Education is a service that transforms fixed quantities of inputs (individuals) into 
individuals with different qualities.” (Hanushek, 1986) In fact, education is an extremely 
powerful mechanism which holds the potential to create opportunities and promote social 
mobility.  
For Gary Becker, education is a way of investing in Human Capital. According to this 
theory, one can think of education as an investment decision, where current income 
opportunities are renounced in exchange for improved future income. In light of the 
Human Capital Theory, education should not be simply seen as a personal benefit 
(increase in wages), but should also be seen as a way of create social benefit due to the 
positive externalities associated to it. Consequently government intervention on the 
educational sector is beneficial and is a potential Pareto improvement. 
Many studies have been carried out regarding the factors that influence student 
achievement and the true contributions of school factors (class size, quality of teachers) 
and external school factors, namely socioeconomic and cultural factors. 
Another relevant topic linked to this discussion is School Performance indicators. Not 
only are these indicators used by parents when trying to find the best schools for their 
children, but they are also used by schools to compare their performance with local 
competitors. The classic indicator used to assess school performance is the mean or 
median of exam/test scores. In Portugal, newspapers annually publish school rankings 
based on exam scores. We must take into account, however, that this indicator has serious 
weaknesses when used to measure school performance (Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 
1996; Meyer, 1995). The most serious flaw is that it ignores both socioeconomic and 
cultural factors.  
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The present project explores the main variables that contribute to the explanation of 
student achievement on Portuguese 9
th
 grade exams. Based on this analysis, it presents an 
alternative indicator for school performance. 
This project addresses these tasks through an empirical analysis based on school‟s 9
th
 
grade exam results in Portugal. There is so far no study like this one that takes up this 
issue for the 9
th
 grade exams.   
This study is especially significant in the Portuguese case, since it is one of the 
European countries with the highest levels of income inequalities. According to OECD 
data, the level of inequality in Portugal is only comparable to the level observable in the 
US, which presents the highest level of inequality in developed countries. (OECD, 2005) 
Portugal is also one of countries with the highest dropout and failure rate in Europe.  
I have found is that an important causal effect between the characteristics of each 
municipality and school exam results. These characteristics include, but are not limited to, 
the average per capita income in these municipalities and the education level. 
 Subsequently, based on these results I propose an alternative and innovative indicator 
to measure the school performance. The proposed adjusted measure of achievement 
consists of the ratio between the school‟s current average score and the expected average 
score if the school were as successful as the reference variables of the municipality. This 
indicator allows measuring the true school performance, isolating it from the 
socioeconomic and cultural factors. 
More specifically, I address the following questions: First, I use literature review to ask 
which are the variables that truly influence student achievement? Additionally, I answer 
what the implications of relying on school rankings which are based on exam scores as an 
indicator of the school performance are?  
Secondly, to what extent are average school scores influenced by socioeconomic and 
cultural variables? Thirdly, are there any persisting regional effects after socioeconomic 
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and cultural variables are controlled? Fourthly, how does the adjusted measure of school 
performance compare to school rankings? 
The project is divided into seven key sections; including the Introduction in Section I. 
In Section II, I discuss, based on literature and empirical work, the main variables which 
explain student achievement and a brief analysis of the implications and the consequent 
disadvantages of using average test scores to assess school performance. In Section III, I 
will describe the structure of the Portuguese educational system whilst in Section IV I 
describe the chosen data and the variables. I also present an econometric model to analyze 
the impact that internal school and municipality variables (socioeconomic and cultural 
conditions) have on average school exam scores. In Section V, I present the regression 
results. In section VI, I develop an adjusted measure of school performance. Lastly, in 
Section VII, I present my main conclusions and some proposals for further research. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature on academic performance indicators, as regards this analysis, can be 
broadly grouped into two areas. Firstly, many studies analyze the educational performance 
indicators, discussing their validity and the main limitations of this measure.  
Mancebón and Bandrés 1999, in their study described some features of the educational 
process that should be take into account regarding the assessment of school performance: 
i) “the cumulative nature of the educational process”; student achievement is influenced 
by many factors, namely, the student‟s prior years of education, their socioeconomic 
background and cognitive skills, ii) the importance of exogenous factors to the school. 
“The uniqueness of the educational production process implies that a significant effort 
must be made to filter out what is really provided by each school.”  
In the majority of countries, there is no single source that regularly provides 
appropriate data regarding the performance of schools that can be used for analyzing 
policies. Therefore, most of the empirical work in this field comes from the school 
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average scores on the exams, namely the SAT‟s (Scholastic Aptitude Test), the ACT‟s 
(American College Testing program) for United States or PISA for international 
comparisons. In spite of this, Hanushek (1990) considers that this data is severely limited 
in the evaluation of school performance. In fact, the use of the average (or median) of this 
type of test scores has been severely criticized by the literature due to the number of 
fallacies it contains. Meyer uses simulations to show that this indicator provide a 
misleading portrait of school specificities of performance for grade levels and its evolution 
over time, since it is an averaged. Moreover, the author points to the fact that this indicator 
encourages schools to participate in “cream skimming”, that is, schools tend to invest their 
efforts on those students who tend to achieve higher tests scores in order to increase the 
school‟s performance. Bradley and Taylor (2002) argue that this effect is particularly 
noteworthy in private schools where processes of selective admissions prevail. Reback 
2007, studied the school short-run incentives to improve student´s expected performance, 
and he found that students perform better than expected when their test score is 
particularly important for the school accountability rating, since the school support more 
students in this case. Another form of “cream skimming” was pointed out by Shepard 
(1991), and consists of retaining students at a given grade level or encouraging low 
performance students to transfer to another school.  Other limitations of exams scores as 
performance indicator are presented in literature. Ladd (2001) points out that schools with 
poor exams results are labeled as “failing” schools even though these schools may be 
performing well if the prior performance of their students is taken into account. And most 
importantly, it fails to distinguish the school‟s true contribution to improved student 
achievement from external factors to the school such as the student‟s „individual 
characteristics, family background and neighborhood/community” (Hanusheck and Taylor 
1990). 
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Second, there are studies that address the contribution of student´s individual´s 
characteristics, their family and neighborhood features for the children´s achievement. 
The Coleman Report in 1966 provided strong evidence for the pivotal role of the family 
background and cultural factors in determining children‟s achievement. A large volume of 
empirical evidence (Datcher-Loury 1989) has supported this claim.  
Many authors have proposed an educational production function to measure the 
efficiency of school inputs on educational output. The production function compares the 
educational output (e.g. achievement in tests scores, graduation rates) with a set of inputs. 
Jerrim and Micklewright (2010) concluded that children have better results when parents 
spend more time with them developing their skills, and the more educated parents tend to 
be, the more effective in transmitting the knowledge they are.  However, the authors face 
many statistical problems with the inclusion of “family income” in their model. Other 
authors, namely Strauss and Sawyer (1986) recognize this problem. 
In spite of this, researchers such as Becker (1981) and Danziger and Waldfogel (2000), 
among others, have pinpointed the positive and significant impacts that family income has 
on student‟s achievement. Families with high economic resources are more likely to 
produce important inputs for their children‟s development, providing greater educational 
resources (books), better pre-school child-care and, among other things, children have the 
possibility to attend private tutoring. This last factor is significant in Portugal, according to 
Neto-Mendes, Costa and Ventura (2003). Acemoglu and Angrist (1999), found also an 
important correlation between the average schooling in US and the state wage levels, 
based on an instrumental variables strategy.  
Although the relative importance of different home resources is still debatable, it is safe 
to say that, at least according to the literature, family structure has a significant impact on 
school achievement. It is becoming increasingly clear that children who live in single-
parent-families tend to perform poorly on academic tests compared to those in traditional 
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families (Astone and McLanahan 1991, others). The causes of this phenomenon remain 
unclear; one explanation is the economic disadvantages that single–parent families face 
(Astone and McLanahan, 1994). In terms of family size, there is evidence that larger 
families tend to spend less time with each individual child (Graaf 1986). 
Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (1996) and Graaf, Gaff and Kraaykam (2000), among others, 
have pointed out that cultural capital is another important variable in explaining student 
achievement and have incorporated it in their models. The Cultural Capital Theory is 
related to the socialization process into highbrow activities, such as interest in art and 
music, museum attendance, and reading. In empirical studies, this variable is generally 
measured by family reading habits and participation in formal culture (visits to museums, 
theaters and concerts). However, Povoas (2008) concluded in her project that these 
variables are not significant in explaining school exam scores. 
Many authors have tried to measure the true efficiency of schools and proposed 
alternative evaluation methods for it. Sampaio (2003) has attempted this in Portuguese 
secondary schools. Taking into consideration exam results for 2002 in Mathematics, he 
tries to seperate them from school effects, socioeconomic and cultural impacts as well as 
student‟s characteristics. He concludes that schools influence only the prior achievement. 
Hanushek and Taylor (1990) emphasize that the best school performance indicator is 
valued-added. However, this measure is extremely difficult to implement since the 
information required for it is rarely available. This topic will be discussed further in 
Section V. 
III. THE PORTUGUESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AT A GLANCE 
3.1. The Educational System 
The Portuguese Educational system is comprised of Public, Private and State-funded 
Private schools. At all levels of education, parents can opt for Private schools. Private 
schools charge fees, although there are some Private schools or some types of Private 
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schools that are financed by the Government. Both teaching contents and methods are 
defined by the Ministry of Education at all types of school up to the 12
th
 grade.  
The Educational system is represented in Figure 1, found in the Appendix. In Portugal, 
pre-primary schooling is not compulsory for children between 3 and 5 years of age. 
Compulsory school is divided into three main cycles: the first cycle which includes grades 
1 to 4 (at the 4
th
 grade, students are required to do provas de aferição); the second cycle 
which includes the next two grades (at the end of which students are required to do provas 
de aferição) and finally, the third cycle which lasts 3 years (students are required to do 
exams in both Portuguese and Mathematics in the 9
th
 grade in order to conclude 
compulsory school). 
1
After this basic education, secondary education follows, which is 
optional. In secondary school, students can opt between general and technological (work-
oriented) courses.
 
 
As regards public school ownership, first cycle schools are run by the Central 
Government and belong to the municipalities. Second and Third cycle schools are both 
run and owned by the Central Government. Public schools are free of charge; however, 
complementary financial aid is available for all disadvantaged students. According to the 
Ministry of Education, this financial aid should help support food, accommodation and 
school materials expenses.  
This project focuses only on 3
rd
 cycle education, specifically 9
th
 grade exam results. 
Note that the ENEB (Exames Nacionais do Ensino Básico) are only mandated for schools 
on continental Portugal and Madeira.  
3.2. Portuguese School Evaluation 
 
In Portugal, legislation was passed in 2002 which permitted self evaluation and 
external evaluation of schools. 
1 
9
th
 grade exams were introduced in 2005 and are mandatory at all schools in Portugal except in the Azores. 
Azores decided not to apply the 9
th
 grade exams due to their autonomy in some matters relative to the central 
government. 
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Despite this effort, there is still no systematic method for evaluating school 
performance in place. In general, evaluation is based on an informal and simplistic method 
conducted by newspapers which compute school rankings based on average exam grades. 
Communication of these rankings for basic schools only began in 2005, based on the 
school results of 9
th
 grade national exams. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Education created a “working group for school evaluation”, 
with an aim to define models for self and external evaluation in pre-schools, basic and 
secondary schools. A year later, a department of the General Inspectorate of Education 
(IGE) was established, to evaluate 100 schools that voluntarily agreed to participate. The 
IGE evaluates several aspects (e.g. organization and management of the school, 
leadership, auto-regulation capacity, and results on various levels) and all visited schools 
received a report stating the weaknesses and strengths of the school as seen by the IGE. 
This external evaluation has being extended to all schools in Portugal. In Section V I will 
discuss this subject further. 
IV. DISCUSSION  
4.1. Methodology and Data 
Table1 summarizes the inputs and output variables used in the study. 
Inputs Outputs 
School related variables             School average scores of 9th grade exams 
Municipality socioeconomic variables  
Municipality cultural variables   
Table 1: Inputs and Outputs  
9
th
 grade exam score data is published by the Portuguese Ministry of Education. This 
data has been published every year since 2005. The last available year is 2010.  
The information for these 5 available years was taken from Direcção Geral de Inovação 
e Desenvolvimento Curricular (DGIDC), which belongs to the Portuguese Ministry of 
Education. In the computation of average school exam score is taking into account the 
both exams Portuguese and Mathematics, and only internal students and first call exams.  
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A cautionary note is advisable before proceeding. At any type of school in a given year, 
there are two types of students who may take a national exam: internal and external 
students. Internal students are regular students who take a national exam as a student 
belonging to that school whereas external students include those who register for exams 
on an independent basis
2
.On the other hand, for each exam in a given year, there are two 
calls. The first call is a compulsory phase that occurs in June and includes all regular 
students who are automatically enrolled at the school. The second phase is in September 
and is only for students who have not been able to successfully pass the 9
th
 grade in the 
first phase. Here, I will only consider the first phase. 
As regards inputs, I will examine in more detail the variables and the respective proxies 
in section 4.2. However, it is important at this point to mention the type and the level of 
analyses. Unfortunately, in Portugal, there are no historical databases regarding student 
performance and corresponding family background. Furthermore, the national exam 
database does not contain information regarding the student‟s prior school results or their 
socio-cultural background. For this reason, socioeconomic and cultural data is only 
available at a municipality level.  
On the other hand, municipality–level variables are not available on a yearly basis, 
since the majority of data only pertains to the last census year - 2001. For this reason I do 
not possess a complete data-panel.  
Therefore, I will alternatively use a repeated cross section, where I compare average 
school grades of a particular year, on that year‟s school-level explanatory variables and 
socioeconomic and cultural explanatory variables.   
 
2. 
It could be a potential manipulation bias from the schools, since schools have an incentive to fail some 
low mark students, which means they will take the national exam as an external student. Therefore, this 
student‟s score will not be taken into account whilst calculating the school‟s average. Theoretically, all 
school types (Private, Public and State-funded Private Schools) benefit from a higher average score and 
consequently a higher position in the rankings. Although, in practice, Private Schools have an additional 
incentive to manipulate these scores since they charge fees and want to attract more students. 
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In Table 2 I compute the correlation between average school exams scores (the average 
score of both exams, Mathematics and Portuguese) for the last six years.  
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2005 1 
     
2006 0,77 1 
    
2007 0,73 0,79 1 
   
2008 0,72 0,77 0,77 1 
  
2009 0,71 0,71 0,74 0,74 1 
 
2010 0,67 0,71 0,74 0,71 0,78 1 
Table 2: Pairwise average score correlation coefficient for the six available years. 
Correlation is always positive (values are always greater than 0) and the correlation 
values vary between 0,67 and 0,79, which is close to 1. School exams scores are quite 
stable across time: this means that one expects that a school that presents a high exam 
score in a certain year will continue to exhibit high average scores in the following year. 
Not surprisingly, the correlation values decrease as one moves further from a given year. 
I also analyze the correlation between average scores in nation-wide Portuguese 
and Mathematics exams; the Pairwise correlation table is shown in the Appendix, table 3.  
Again, all correlation values are positive and quite large. Correlations between 
Portuguese and Mathematics exams scores for the same year are represented diagonally. 
As one can see, these values are high, ranging between 0,73 and 0,79, which means that 
the scores for the exam in Portuguese is extremely interconnected with the Mathematics 
exam score. Again, the correlation between the two exams scores decreases as the 
temporal interval between them increases. 
Based on these correlations, one concludes that school scores are fairly stable through 
the years. For this reason, in practice is not necessary to do a repeated cross section for the 
five years; it is only necessarily to do a regression for one year, since school scores are 
highly correlated throughout the years. In order to ensure a more consistent estimate, I 
have decided to do a cross section for 2005, since the temporal difference between some 
of the explanatory variables, namely the socioeconomic variables are only available for 
the last census (2001) and the output is lower thus eliminating the possibilities of bias.  
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On the other hand, I have decided to consider the school average score on both exams 
as a dependent variable, instead of carrying out separate estimates for school scores on 
Mathematics and Portuguese, since these two variables are also highly correlated.  
My sample includes 1374 schools and represents all the schools that participated in the 
9
th
 grade exam at least once between 2005 and 2010. In 2005, the number of schools is 
only 1237.  In Table 4, in the Appendix, I demonstrate the relationship between the 
number of schools and the municipalities. Note that the Azores, due to its independent 
status, decided not to participate in the 9
th
 grade national exams.  For this reason, I will 
only consider 289 municipalities even though Portugal has 308. All the considered 
municipalities have at least one basic school that participated in the 9
th
 grade exam. There 
is no potential source of bias, as occurs in the case of secondary schools (Povoas 
2008)
3
.Table 5 and 6 summarize the relation between the number of private school and 
PFPRIV and the municipalities. Through these tables, one can conclude that Private and 
State-funded Private Schools are concentrated in 45 and 49 municipalities respectively and 
that the remaining 84% of municipalities in Portugal do not possess any Private schools. 
Lisbon and Oporto alone have more than 11 Private schools. 
4.2. Empirical Model and Variables 
Ideally, my objective here would be to explain school exam scores through individual 
characteristics, family background (parents‟ income, school variables (infrastructures, 
teachers‟ quality, peer effect) and socioeconomic variables that affect the neighborhood. 
Unfortunately, individual and family background data is not available in Portugal and 
even school-level data is scarce, as mentioned above.
4 
 3. There is no occurrence of bias in this sample due to the fact that all municipalities have at least one basic 
school, and therefore all the students‟ socioeconomic backgrounds are taken into account. On the other hand, 
all schools are included in this analysis, even those with a lower number of students, whereas these schools 
are not generally taken into account in newspaper ranking. 
 
4
.In the estimate there is no bias created by the temporal difference between the explanatory variables 
(municipality variables only available in 2001) and the school average score in 9
th
 grade exams, (the 
dependant variable between 2005 and 2010), since explanatory variables can be considered as structural 
parameters. The structural parameters are variables that, in real terms, are not subject to change. However, in 
order to ensure a more consistent estimate, I will make the estimation upon the exam results for 2005. 
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In table 7 in the Appendix, I describe the variables used in this project and their 
sources. Therefore, my strategy will be to link average academic scores in 9
th
 grade exams 
to socioeconomic and cultural variables, that is, match each school to the corresponding 
socioeconomic and cultural variables of its municipality. 
This methodology is justified by the governmental school allocation rule. In Portuguese 
Public Schools students are allocated according to their place of residence or, 
alternatively, to where their parents‟ workplace is located. According to this criterion, 
students should be allocated to the nearest school to their residence, e.g. the school in their 
municipality, or alternatively, in some cases, to their parent´s workplace. For this reason, I 
shall use the municipal-level data as a proxy for students‟ socioeconomic background. 
The main specification that I estimate is as follows: 
                                                        
                                
Where S refers to the school and M to the municipality where it is located.  The 
dependant variable, Ys, refers to the average academic score in 9
th
 grade exams; in terms 
of the explanatory variables Table 7 presents the definition, source and year of each 
variable and Table 8 presents the main descriptive statistics. 
Now, I will present and justify the main variables and respective proxies.  
Municipality Income: The variable INCM stands for municipality income. Many 
authors have included the relationship between educational outcomes and family income 
in their research (e.g. Blanden and Machin, 2004), and numerous studies have documented 
a positive relation between parents‟ income and the school. There is also a conviction that 
wealthier regions are relatively prosperous. I take into consideration four alternative 
proxies: Purchasing Power (PPM); Proportion Purchasing Power (PPPM)
5
;  
5. 
PPPM measures the proportion of purchasing power of a given municipality in relation to the remaining 
country, and takes into account population size and the real per capita income, i.e. the position of a given 
municipality in relation to the national average in terms of real per capita income. The sum of the PPP of all 
municipalities in Portugal equals 100%. 
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Unemployment Rate (UNEMM) and monthly average income (AVERAGEINCM). In 
terms of signs, I expect a positive sign for PPM, PPPM and AVERAGEINCM and a negative 
sign for UNEMM. 
Municipality Education: in the specification, municipality education is represented by 
the variable EDUM. In order to be successful, children require a certain amount of human 
resources provision; the importance of these factors were shown by Murnane, Maynard 
and Ohls (1981) among others, which compare the impact of “human resources” with the 
impact of “material inputs” (games or reading material), concluding that human resources 
is relatively more important to children‟s achievement. Higher educated parents provide 
intellectual stimulation and are more effective in guiding their child through successful 
cognitive developments.As regards regions, there is evidence that supports that higher 
educated regions show a greater concern for the education of future generations, providing 
a propitious environment to education and a more educational-friendly background 
(Carneiro 2006, Murnane, Maynard and Ohls 1981). I have tried four different proxies: the 
percentage of people in the municipality who have completed, at least, mandatory school 
(MANDM), the percentage of people that have completed higher education (HIGHERM); 
illiteracy rate (ILLITM) and dropout rate (DROPM). I expect a positive sign for MANDM 
and HIGHERM and a negative sign for ILLITM. Please note that all these variables 
measure long-term effects of the municipal education level, except DROPM, which 
captures the contemporaneous effect of the surrounding educational background. DROPM 
has an ambiguous effect on achievement. On the one hand, a higher dropout rate could 
indicate higher student selection, this fact has a positive effect in achievement and 
therefore one could expect a positive sign. But on the other hand, a higher dropout rate 
could mean an unfavorable academic background, and in this situation, I expect a negative 
sign.   
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Municipality culture: CultM stands for cultural capital. Graaf (2000), measures the 
cultural resources by taking into account the family‟s reading habits and its participation 
in formal culture. “Reading habits are measured by the number of hours per week parents 
spend reading and by the number of visits to libraries. Participation in culture is 
measured by the number of visits parents make per month to museums, theaters or 
concerts.” I have only taken into account formal culture as a measure in cultural capital. 
To reflect this effect, I have introduced a proxy MONUM that stands for the number of 
monuments per resident and ICULTM, the cultural infrastructures per resident in each 
municipality. I also consider a proxy to reflect investment in culture: the amount of per 
capita cultural expenditures in the municipality (EXPCULM). One would expect that a 
more culture-friendly municipality would stimulate students and increase their academic 
results. I therefore expect a positive sign. 
Municipality Demography: In the regression, DEMM refers to the demography variable.  
Póvoas (2008) in her project called attention to the fact that educational variables are 
dependent on the demographic structure of the population in each given municipality, 
particularly MANDM and ILLITM, as well as some cultural variables. For this reason, I 
have included some demography proxies, for instance OLDM, to control the percentage of 
resident population in a given municipality which is over 65 years old and the average age 
in the municipality (AVRGAGEM). In my regression I include an immigration variable, 
the percentage of foreign people residing in the municipality (FOREIGNM). 
Unfortunately, there is no available data according to race. On the other hand, numerous 
studies have shown that children from single parent families are at a disadvantage as 
regards academic results compared with two-parent families.
6 
Therefore I have also 
included a variable to represent the impact of single parent families (SINGLEM). I
 
have 
complemented the analysis introducing one variable for family size, the percentage of 
 
6.
McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; McNab and Murray 1985; Murrays and Sandqvist 1990; Pong, Dronkers, 
and Hampden-Thompson 2003. 
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families with more than 3 children (CHILDREN_3M). It is believed that families with 
many children tend to spend less time with each individual child as compared with 
families with only one child.  
Municipality quality of life: The variable BUILDM stands for the average age of 
buildings in a given municipality. This variable reflects quality of life, insofar as new 
buildings would be better suited to today‟s needs. The age of buildings could also be a 
proxy which corresponds to regional economic dynamics, since places with new buildings 
receive more investment. The expected coefficient sign is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
one would a negative sign due to the regional economic dynamics that are lower in regions 
where buildings are older. But on the other hand, cities have the oldest buildings, so the 
proxy may also reflect the economic and demographic dynamics in the cities, which 
would then lead us to expect a positive sign. 
 Municipality Social Capital: The variable SOCIALCAPM refers to the Social Capital. 
Coleman introduces a new type of capital: Social Capital. According to his study, this type 
of capital has important effects on child wellbeing, particularly educational achievement 
and the adoption of new technologies by society. Many researchers have included this 
variable in their studies, in order to reflect citizenship. I will try two proxies: the 
abstention rate in local municipal elections (VOTEM) and the percentage of recycle 
residues per resident (RECYM). In terms of coefficient signs one might expect a negative 
sign VOTEM and a positive sign for RECYCLEM. 
School variables: Krueger (1999) emphasized the importance of class size and the 
fact that student achievement increases in small classes, this beneficial effect persists 
throughout one‟s life, and the probability to attend university is higher. Hoxby 2000, 
studied the effect of class size on student achievement using longitudinal variation in the 
population associated to each grade in 649 schools elementary school. However her 
estimations indicated that class size doesn‟t have a statistically significant effect on 
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student‟s scores. Unfortunately, there is no available data in terms of class size, so, 
alternatively, I will use the number of exams per school (EXAMSs) as a proxy for school 
dimension. A bigger school may have economies of scale (Povoas 2008), it may have 
more specialized teachers with longer teaching experience in preparing students for the 
exams. On the other hand, in small schools, teachers could be forced to teach several 
subjects which could have a negative impact on the children‟s achievement. However, in 
smaller schools teachers sometimes have the ability to give more attention to each student, 
resulting in a more familiar environment (not necessarily a higher teacher/pupil ratio), 
which would increase average school grades. Therefore the EXAMSM coefficient sign is 
ambiguous. I have also considered a variable which takes into account the teacher/pupil 
ratio: the percentage of 3
rd
 cycle and secondary teachers relative to the number of 3
rd
 cycle 
and secondary students. Unfortunately, this variable is only available for NUTIII, I have, 
nevertheless, decided to include it since it proved to be significant in the estimations.  
Many authors suggest the existence of a gender gap, which is evident in exam scores, and 
is explained due to the greater effort exerted by female students. I include the percentage 
of female participation in 9
th
 grade exams per school (GIRLS) as a proxy of gender, and 
the percentage of students under 16 participating in 9
th
 grade exams per school (AGEs), as 
a proxy of age. Please note that students who are over 16 in 9th grade exams signify that 
these students have stayed back at least one year. In terms of signs, one expects a positive 
sign for GIRLS and for AGE .
7
 In Portugal there are three types of schools. I will therefore 
consider two dummies PUBS and PFPRIVS. The dummy PUBS is equal to 1 if it is a 
public school and 0 otherwise. The dummy PFPRIVS is equal to 1 if it is a State-funded 
private school and 0 otherwise. For PUBS and PFPRIVs one expects a negative sign. 
Private schools are characterized by either wealthier or more able individuals who wish 
7
. Females face a greater increase in labor market returns from signaling due to their academic performance. 
Despite this fact, particularly in developing and Asian countries, female investment in human capital is 
significantly lower as compared with men, which can have a negative influence on female levels of 
achievement. 
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to invest additional resources in education besides that which is guaranteed by the state. 
Obviously this dummy reflects other aspects, namely, the differences of school 
environments and the peer effect. According to Zimmerman (1999) and others, private 
schools are expected to be more organized, since they are smaller than public ones and 
have a higher financial autonomy as compared with the Central Government. 
Additionally, the existence of peer effects that aid in the creation of a different “academic 
environment” and “social units” which may have a positive impact on academic results. 
Hoby 2000 analyzes the impact of gender and race on class performance. She concluded 
that peer effect are relevant, and having peers that score 1 point higher increase an 
individual‟s score by 0,10 to 0,55. This effect is stronger intra-race and a more female 
peer group increases achievement. I include the variable COMPETD, which corresponds to 
the number of schools per resident. This variable aims to measure the impact of 
competition between the schools in each district. There is a continuous claim that 
increased competition between schools increase levels of student achievement (e.g. Ponzo 
2010). “Moreover, many authors show that students achieve much better outcomes if 
schools operating in more competitive environments also experience a higher pressure on 
academic standards coming from parents”. Hence, one expects a positive sign. 
In order to cross-check the analysis, other controls are used relative to the selected 
regressions. I include regional dummies in the regression, which allows me to check 
whether there are persisting regional effects, even controlling for socioeconomic factors. I 
cross-check this analysis by using average 9
th
 grade exam scores in schools as dependent 
variable between 2005 and 2010 for both exams (Mathematics and Portuguese) together 
and also separately. 
V. RESULTS 
I have made many estimates, using different combinations of variables. All the 
estimates made for the baseline specification are presented in table 9. The Reg2 
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corresponds to the baseline specification. (Consult Statistical and econometric 
considerations in Appendix)  
 
 
As was explained above I choose PPM as a proxy for income, this variable always 
presents positive coefficients, and is more significant than PPPM. As one can see in 
column 5, the variable INCM is also a significant variable, however the coefficient value is 
PPM, an increase of 1 percentage point in municipality average income increases by only 
0,0002% the school average grade. Although unemployment has always had negative 
coefficients, the amounts are not significant. It is therefore not possible to ensure that 
schools located in municipalities with a low rate of unemployment have better results, 
ceteris paribus. 
In terms of the educational variables, MANDM and HIGHERM variables have always 
presented positive and significant coefficients. In spite of this, HIGHERM has a much 
higher coefficient, meaning that the percentages of residents in each municipality who 
have attended higher education have a greater influence exam results then the percentage 
of people who have only attended compulsory education. For this reason, and in order to 
Variable Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 Reg6 Reg7 
constant 1,6706 *** 1,7063 *** 1,4526 *** 1,6267 *** 1,6118 *** 3,0895 *** 3,1544 *** 
Exams 0,0004 *** 0,0004 *** 0,0041 *** 0,0004 *** 0,0004 ***     
PUB -0,3425 *** -0,3429 *** -0,3462 *** -0,3564 *** -0,3587 *** -0,3956 *** -0,3873 *** 
PFPRIV -0,2070 *** -0,2165 *** -0,2228 *** -0,2160 *** -0,2248 *** -0,2935 *** -0,2872 *** 
AGE 1,3903 *** 1,3897 *** 1,4170 *** 1,3891 *** 1,4076 ***     
HIGH 0,9647 *** 0,8328 *** 0,7752 ***      *** 1,3726 *** 
IMMIG -1,3381 *** -1,4785 *** -1,5557 *** -1,4268 *** -1,5097 *** -2,3031 *** -1,6687 *** 
Children_3 -0,9513 *** -0,6023 * -0,5670 * -0,9155 *** -0,6043 * -0,8980 *** -0,4735  
DROP   -2,0254 *** -1,3709 *   -2,2377 *** -2,1179 *** -2,4623 *** 
TEACHERS     4,2055 **         
PP       0,0015 ***   0,0017 ***   
INC         0,0002 ***     
UNEM           -1,0697 **   
MONO             -1,2651 * 
               
N 1237 1237 1237 1237 1237 1237 1237 
R2 0,401 0,409 0,405 0,394 0,399 0,243 0,247 
Table 9: Baseline Specification and other regressions. 
Legend: * p<0,05;   ** p<0,01;   *** p<0,001 
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avoid a multicollinearity problem in my baseline specification, I have decided to apply the 
HIGHERM. The level of illiteracy in each municipality doesn´t has any effect on exams 
score. The dropout variable is significant and presents a negative coefficient, which means 
that municipalities with high drop-out rates negatively influence average scores, that is, 
schools located in regions where there is a lower quality educational background present 
poorer results. I have tried to apply the PPM and the HIGHM together; however, this 
undermines the income variable. This occurs because these two variables are correlated.
8
 
As regards school variables, the GENDERs variable is not significant, meaning that in 
our model gender does not affect the school‟s average exam scores. I have introduced two 
dummies to reflect the type of school; the reference category is Private school. As 
expected, Public schools and State-funded Private schools do worse than private ones, 
since the two dummies present both negative coefficients. Please note that public schools 
present poorer results than state-funded public schools. Unfortunately, upon only these 
regressions it is impossible to calculate whether this effect is due to the positive link 
between private schools and privileged socioeconomic backgrounds or to school 
differences, such as organization or peer effect. 
The variable EXAMSS reflect the number of students per school in the 9
th
 grade, this 
variable is significant and the coefficient is positive. This means that bigger schools have 
better results than smaller ones. This can be explained by the fact that teacher‟s experience 
in preparing students for the exams and the levels of teacher specialization is higher in 
bigger schools. On the other hand, the economies of scale and the spillovers due to 
student‟s mix characteristics may offset the fact that, at small schools, there may be a 
more familiar environment. In spite of this, I cannot reject the possibility that a better 
8. 
This makes sense, according to the economic theory that the higher the education level is the higher the 
wages will increase, however, with decreasing marginal productivities. On the other hand, one can see that 
the impact of higher education on the municipality, in explaining exam scores, is stronger than the effect 
generated by the income variables PPM or INCM. Hence, in my baseline specification I decided to apply the 
variable HIGHERM.  
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school attracts more students and not otherwise, (the school is better due to the fact that it 
is bigger). 
Parents may decide to send their children to better schools which, in turn, will increase 
their number of students. This effect could create a problem of endogeneity. This effect, 
however, is quite limited for public schools in Portugal due to the student allocation rule 
which states that students be allocated to the nearest school.  
The proxy AGES reflects the percentage of students who have never stayed back. As a 
general rule, better schools present lower percentages, therefore, this variable tends to be 
close to 1. The variable teachersM, corresponds to the number of teachers per student. This 
variable is only available in terms of NUTIII, although it is a significant variable, and the 
coefficient is positive and high. 
With regards to the competition between schools, I have introduced variable ratioM, the 
ratio between the number of private schools and public schools in each municipality. 
However this variable is not significant, this occurs due to the low number of 
municipalities with private schools (Section 4.1).  
In terms of the cultural variables I have applied EXPCULM, this variable is not 
significant, which means that according to our model, the expenditures in culture per 
municipality does not have an impact on the students‟ grades. Despite this fact, it is not 
possible to conclude, based simply on this data, that diversity in cultural infrastructures 
does not have an influence on student achievement. We are only able to capture the 
investment per municipality in 2001.  
With regards to demographic variables, the average age of the residents in a 
municipality is not a significant variable in explaining average exam results. The MONOM 
variable is significant in some regressions, and presents a negative sign as was expected. I 
have also introduced a variable which represents the size of the family. Based on my 
regression, the variable CHILDREN_3 is significant and the coefficient is negative, which 
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means that when families have more than 3 children there is a negative impact on the 
average exam results. The percentage of immigrants per municipality is also a significant 
variable. The coefficient is negative, which implies that municipalities with many 
immigrants have a negative influence on the student´s exams scores. In reality, immigrants 
tend to work lower-paying jobs and, in some cases, students have to deal with the 
language barrier which makes the learning processincreasingly difficult. In spite of this, 
this variable can be a proxy of the neighborhood environment. Some groups of immigrants 
tend to live in poorer neighborhoods. 
In order to consider citizenship, I have introduced the variable VOTEM, which is also 
not statistically significant. The variable BUILDM has a negative sign and occurs because 
regional economic dynamics are lower in regions where buildings are older. 
To cross-check, I have done a regression using the school average in Mathematics and 
Portuguese exams and the school average for the exams from 2005 to 2010 as dependent 
variables. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 10 in the Appendix. 
5.2. Regional Differences 
In this section I have introduced Regional dummies in my baseline specification 
(Reg2). The regional variable allows me to check whether regional effects still persist 
even after controlling for socioeconomic variables. For this purpose, I have used the NUT 
II regional division of the Portuguese territory. There are seven NUTII regions in 
Portugal: Norte, Centro, Lisboa, Alentejo, Algarve, Azores and Madeira. However, I 
consider only six regions since the Azores did not participate in 9th grade exams. For this 
reason, I have considered five dummies and the omitted variable is Centro. 
The results of the baseline specification including the regional dummies are presented 
in column 1 (reg8) of Table 11 in the Appendix. Based on the table one can conclude that 
if a given school is located in Norte, Lisboa or Algarve, it is expected to have lower 
average grades in exams than a school located in the region of Centro, ceteris paribus. 
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Unfortunately, although the variables Alentejo and Madeira present a negative coefficient, 
these variables are not significant and as such one cannot make any conclusion about these 
regions. The schools located in Alentejo, followed by schools located in Lisboa are the 
ones that, on average, have a better performance than those in Centro considering only the 
significant variables. 
In terms of the other variables, they maintain the same sign, however, as one can see 
when I included the regional dummies in the baseline specification, the DROP variable is 
no longer statistically significant. For this reason, I have presented the same regression 
without DROPM in Column 1 (reg8). The results are very similar to the previous 
specification and the adjusted R-squared is also similar. 
The asymmetries between the regions can be explained by natural conditions or 
historical reasons that influence the educational structure and environment. It may also 
result from reinforcing forces that attract more people, more and better students and 
teachers, further reinforcing the attractiveness of the region. On the other hand, 
immigration could be another explanation, in fact, there are asymmetries between the 
number of immigrants throughout the regions; immigrants tend to concentrate more on 
bigger cities such as Lisboa and Porto and in the Algarve region. Another explanation is 
region labor market dynamics. The Portuguese labor market is characterized by tough 
models of employment protection and a low dynamic, in terms of job creation and job 
extinction, which limit worker flows between jobs. Portugal and Blanchard (2001), 
characterize the Portuguese labor market as a market with “very low labor mobility”, 
making the economy more sclerotic. According to the authors, this situation is related to 
the low work turnover, the influence of job protection legislation on labor demand and 
regional labor mobility. The Portuguese labor market is considered to be one of the least 
dynamic in the OECD. The opportunity cost of going to school is very different across the 
regions, proving to be higher in more stagnated and poorer regions. 
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VI. ALTERNATIVE SCHOOL MEASURE 
The use of the average exam scores as a measure of school quality presents many 
limitations as has been pointed out above. In this section, I will analyze an alternative 
measure for school quality. 
6.1. The AGES variable 
In analyzing school quality one can consider three types of variables: Socio-economic 
and cultural variables, namely family background and neighborhood; school related 
variables, such as peer effects, class size and student/teacher ratios and the output 
variables, such as students‟ average scores. The first two types of variables can be 
considered as input variables. When analyzing school output variables, the most evident is 
average exam scores. The AGE variable, however, (percentage of students under 16) can 
also be interpreted as a school output variable. In fact, this variable is a proxy of the 
percentage of the students that had never stayed backbefore the 9
th
 grade. (consult table 12 
in the Appendix, the regression as dependant variable AGE) 
I decided not to exclude the variable AGE of the baseline specification, although I am 
aware of the possibility that this variable can also be considered an output. I used the 
Ramsey RESET test to analyze the existence of omitted variables on the baseline 
specification with the AGE variable and on the model which does not include the AGE 
variable. In the specification without AGE there is evidence for omitted variables. On the 
other hand, upon application of AGE to the baseline specification, I do not reject the null 
hypotheses. For this reason, I have decided to keep the variable AGE and to use reg 2 as 
my baseline specification. 
6.2. Adjusted Measure of School Performance 
The adjusted measure of school achievement consists in the ratio between the current 
average school score and the expected average school score if the school was as successful 
as the reference variables of the municipality (determinate based on Baseline specification 
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reg2). This indicator enables us to measure school performance using socio-economic and 
cultural variables. If a school has a ratio equal to one, this means that average school 
scores are equal to the expected ones, taking into account the municipality features and the 
school characteristics. On the other hand, if a school has a ratio higher than one, this 
school has an average exam score which is better than the predicted one, based on the 
municipality and school conditions. For this reason, these schools are considered to be 
successful. In cases where schools present a ratio lower than 1 the opposite occurs. 
Based on the ratio results, it is possible to construct a ranking, where the schools with 
the highest ratio are in the top.   
 I constructed this adjusted school measure for 2005, based on 9th grade exams scores. 
Firstly, I determined the expected average school score, replacing the specific school 
values on the baseline specification, regression reg2. I then computed the ratio: 
                            
                                  
                              
 
Table 13, in the Appendix presents the summary statistics for these variables. 
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Graph1: Scatterplot and 45°line for Portugal. 
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Graph1 summarizes each school result. On the graph it is represented by the 45° line 
and the scatter plot corresponding to all school observations. If the observation is on the 
45°line this means that the school average score is equal to the expected one, and in this 
case the ratio is 1. On the other hand, if the observation is above the 45° line, the adjusted 
score ratio is higher than 1. As expected, the plots are concentrated in the middle section 
of the graph and are slightly skewed to the right, since the expected school exams scores 
range between 1,59 and 3,29 and average 2,64. 
In terms of schools, those presenting higher adjusted score ratios are located in 
Machico (Madeira), Alijó (Norte), Braga (Norte) and Aveiro (Centro), respectively and all 
of them are Public schools. The worst ones are located in Montalegre (Norte), Oeiras 
(Lisboa) and Lisboa (Lisboa) respectively, two of them are private. Consult Table 14 and 
15 in the Appendix with the raking based on adjusted score ratio. 
I have compared this ranking with the traditional ranking published in newspapers 
which are based on average exam results. In the Appendix I have constructed the tables 16 
and 17 in relation to the top ten school rankings according to average school scores in 
exams and the ranking for the ten worst schools. 
In terms of schools, the ones with the ten highest average score on the exams are all 
located in Grande Lisboa and Grande Porto, and only two of them are public. The majority 
of the ten worst schools are also located in Grande Lisboa e Grande Porto, and nine 
schools are public. 
As one can see this traditional ranking based on the average exam results are different 
from the one based on adjusted score ratio. The main differences are in the location and on 
the type of schools. In fact in the ranking based on the adjusted score ratio the top ten 
schools are not only located in Grande Lisboa and Grande Porto, but some of them are 
located in poorer regions such as Machico and Alijó. On the other hand the top ten schools 
in this ranking are mainly public schools. 
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However, despite these differences, the correlation between the school positions in both 
rankings are positive and relatively high- approximately 0,89. 
I have also analyzed each region separately; consult Graphs 2 to 7 in the Appendix. 
Proportionately, the Norte is the region with more schools with an adjusted score ratio 
lower than 1, in fact, the majority of schools in this region are concentrated below the 45° 
line. On the other hand, Centro is the region where, proportionally, schools ratios are more 
concentrated around 1. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The typical indicator used to assess school performance is the average and median 
achievement test scores. This indicator, however, is subject to controversy. Hanushesk 
(1990) considers it extremely limited in its evaluation of school performance. In fact, this 
indicator suffers from three main inefficiencies: it creates incentives for school cream 
skimming; it fails to take into account past student performance and does not reflect the 
individual socioeconomic context of the school.  
The first aim of this project is to estimate the importance of these external factors in 
school achievement. The study provides confirmation for existing theories about the ways 
in which family structure, income and education influence school performance. In fact, a 
community with a lower percentage of families with more than three children, and a 
higher percentage of residents with higher education, positively affects school 
achievement. The results also suggest that smaller schools, Public or State-funded Private 
schools and low regional teacher/student ratios negatively influence school scores. The 
cultural variables are, on the most part, irrelevant. Furthermore, regional effects still 
persist after socioeconomic and cultural variables are controlled. These effects are justified 
by natural or historical reasons and labor market dynamics. 
The second aim of this work is to develop a more efficient indicator of school 
performance. This adjusted measure consists in a ratio between current average school 
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scores and the expected average school scores if the school was as successful as the 
reference variables of the municipality. This indicator has the added advantage of 
potentially eliminating the bias that exists in average school scores due to the 
socioeconomic and cultural variables and could eradicate incentives to cream-skimming.  
The main limitations of this study are the nonexistence of a complete dataset for 
student´s and parent´s level. The existences of it may allow developing a more significant 
model with a higher R squared. On the other hand, one important missing variable on the 
analysis is the past student performance, again there is no available data.  
Based on this project, the main implications as regards policies are: Firstly, education 
policies should be innovative and recognize that socio-economic factors, namely family 
income and structure are the fundamental institutions of education and that the traditional 
role of input-based school policies has proved extremely limited. Secondly, human capital 
policy has important intergenerational consequences: not only does it improve the skills of 
the current generation but it also has major effects on future generations. Lastly, further 
information is needed to assess the sensitivity of the proposed school performance 
indicator to alternative statistical models. 
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STATISTICAL AND ECONOMETRIC CONSIDERATIONS APPENDIX 
In terms of the multicolinerity, there could be evidence of it. This problem could occur 
if the correlation between the two variables is too high. This may lead to unreliable 
estimates with standard errors and unexpected signs or magnitudes. 
  
 
 
Table 24: Correlations between the municipality income variables 
I present three proxies of municipality income (Purchasing power; proportion of 
the purchasing power and municipality monthly average income). These three variables 
are positively correlated, with correlation coefficients higher or equal to 0,8, making it 
redundant to include the three variables. For this reason, I have decided to only include 
Purchasing Power. The Purchasing Power variable reflects the wealth of the municipality. 
Because schools from all municipalities have been included, it is not necessary to use a 
variable that accounts for each municipality wealth as compared with the total wealth in 
Portugal, such as PPPM (Proportion of the purchasing power). Thus, in the baseline 
specification I have used PPM, the other two proxies (PPPM and AVERAGEINCM) are 
used to cross-check. 
  HIGH MAND DROP ITTIT 
HIGH 1       
MAND 0,89 1     
DROP -0,45 -0,59 1   
ITTIT -0,61 -0,74 0,32 1 
Table 25: Pairwise Correlations between Educational variables 
In Table 22 one can see that municipality education proxies are also extremely 
correlated. I run regressions using only a subsample of education-related variables.  
  PPPM PPM AVERAGEINCM 
PPPM 1     
PPM 0,82 1   
AVERAGEINCM 0,84 0,8 1 
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The multicollinearity problem could lead to underestimated coefficients and t-statistics, 
so that it would be difficult to access their impact on the grades of 2005. I have therefore 
decided to apply the _rmcoll command in Stata to check the existence of multicollinearity 
on the baseline consideration, and there is no evidence of multicollinearity. 
The used data is extremely heterogeneous, for instance, the proxies for income vary 
significantly from municipality to municipality, and the impact in grades in wealthier 
municipalities will empirically be very different. There is therefore a suspicion of 
heteroscedasticity. The presence of heteroscedasticity implies the violation of constant 
error variance, one of the Gauss Markov assumptions. Even if it neither causes bias nor 
inconsistency of OLS estimators, the estimators‟ variances are no longer valid, nor are 
there conclusions about the statistical significance of the OLS estimates based on t-
statistics.  To evaluate the presence of heteroscedasticity I have applied the Breush-Pagan 
test. This method tests the null hypothesis that error variances are all equal versus the 
alternative that error variances are, in fact, a multiplicative function of one or more 
variables. A large chi-square would indicate that heteroskedasticity was present. The 
results for the baseline specification are presented below: 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of GRADES 
chi2(1)      =    57.02 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
The chi-square is quite large which indicates a presence of heterocedasticity. As such, I 
use robust standard errors in my regressions. Though it does not eradicate 
heteroscedasticity, it corrects standard errors making them consistent whilst increasing the 
significance of truly significant parameters. 
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Some socio-economic and cultural variables are unobserved on conventional data, such 
as parent‟s ability. This unobservable data can create a bias on estimation. I therefore use a 
wide range of proxies, in such a way as to, according to Coulon, Meschi, Vignones and 
others, eliminate evidence of omitted variables. To confirm this statement, I decided to do 
the Ramsey RESET test to check the existence of omissions in the baseline specification. 
As expected, there was no evidence of omitted variables 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of GRADES 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 1224) =     19.17 
Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
TABLES AND GRAPHS APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 3: Pairwise average score between the exams for the six years. 
 
LEVEL GRADE AGE 
Pre-School ---- 3-6  
 
   Compulsory School 
1st Cycle 1st- 4thgrade 6-10  
2ndCycle 5th - 6th grade 10-12  
3rdCycle 7th - 9th grade 12-15 
 
Secondary School 
General Courses 10th- 12thgrade        15-18  
Tecnological courses 
 2005 mat  2006 mat  2007 mat  2008 mat  2009 mat  2010 mat  
2005 port  0,73  0,63  0,57  0,64  0,56  0,51  
2006 port  0,64  0,76  0,64  0,63  0,55  0,55  
2007 port  0,63  0,67  0,74  0,65  0,58  0,58  
2008 port  0,62  0,66  0,7  0,72  0,6  0,6  
2009 port  0,63  0,66  0,65  0,63  0,76  0,65  
2010 port  0,62  0,67  0,66  0,64  0,65  0,79  
Figure1: Portuguese Education  
EEduEducationaSystem  
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Table 4: Relation between the number of schools and municipalities 
 
Table 5: Relation between the number of Private schools and municipalities 
Number of schools Total number  Percentage of   Cumulative percentage  
 per municipality of municipalities total municipalities of total municipalities 
0 0 0,0% 0,0% 
1 90 31,1% 31,1% 
2 49 17,0% 48,1% 
3 42 14,5% 62,6% 
4 18 6,2% 68,9% 
5 19 6,6% 75,4% 
6 16 5,5% 81,0% 
7 11 3,8% 84,8% 
8 7 2,4% 87,2% 
9 6 2,1% 89,3% 
 > 10 31 10,7% 100,0% 
Total 289 100,0%   
Number of schools 
PRIV per municipality 
Total number of 
Municipalities PRIV 
Percentage of total 
municipalities 
Cumulative percentage of 
total municipalities 
0 244 84,4% 84,4% 
1 31 10,7% 95,2% 
2 4 1,4% 96,5% 
3 5 1,7% 98,3% 
4 2 0,7% 99,0% 
5 0 0,0% 99,0% 
6 0 0,0% 99,0% 
7 0 0,0% 99,0% 
8 0 0,0% 99,0% 
9 0 0,0% 99,0% 
10 1 0,3% 99,3% 
>11 2 0,7% 100,0% 
Total 289 100,0%   
Number of schools 
PFRIV per 
municipality 
Total number of 
Municipalities PFRIV 
Percentage of total 
municipalities 
Cumulative percentage of total 
municipalities 
0 240 83,0% 83,0% 
1 36 12,5% 95,5% 
2 7 2,4% 97,9% 
3 3 1,0% 99,0% 
4 1 0,3% 99,3% 
5 1 0,3% 99,7% 
6 0 0,0% 99,7% 
7 0 0,0% 99,7% 
8 0 0,0% 99,7% 
9 1 0,3% 100,0% 
Total 289 100,0%  
Table 6: Relation between the number of State-funded Private schools and municipalities 
 
  Variables Source Year Description 
  Grades GRADE Ministry of Education  
2005-
2010 
Average school grades in 9th grade exams 
  
Purchasing Power PP National Institute of Statistics 
2005-
2007 
  
Municipal 
Proportion of Purchasing Power  PPP National Institute of Statistics 
2005-
2007 
Percentage of total purchasing power per municipality 
Income Monthly average income INC National Institute of Statistics 2001 Percentage of total purchasing power in that municipality 
  
Unemployment rate UNEM National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Unemployed population in the broad sense / 
  Total active population in the broad sense 
 
Percentage of people that  
HIGH National Institute of Statistics 2001 
 Resident population that completed high education/ 
 
completed higher education Resident population 
  
Percentage of people having 
completed compulsory education at 
least MAND National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Resident population that have completed compulsory 
school/ 
 
 
Resident population 
Municipal  
Dropout rate DROP National Institute of Statistics 2001 
People that did not complete the 9th grade  
Education from the resident population of 10-15 years of age / 
 
Resident population of 10-15 years of age 
  
Illiteracy Rate ILLIT National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Resident population that cannot read or write 
  over 10 years of age / 
  Resident population over 10 years of age 
 
Amount of cultural expenditures 
EXPCUL National Institute of Statistics 
2005-
2009 
Cultural expenditures in thousand Euros/ 
 
per resident Resident population 
Municipal 
Cultural infrastructures per resident MONU National Institute of Statistics 2005 
Total number of monuments in the municipality/  
Culture Total resident population in the municipality 
  Number of cultural infrastructure  
ICULT National Institute of Statistics 2005 
Total number of cultural infrastructures/  
  per resident Total resident population in the municipality 
  Percentage of people with  
OLD National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Resident Population with 65 years of age or more/ 
  65 years of age or more (Total resident population in the municipality) 
  Average age AVRGAGE National Institute of Statistics 2001 Average age of resident population per municipality 
Municipal 
Single-Parent families MONO National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Total number of single-parents families/ 
Demography Total number of families in the municipality 
  
Percentage of immigrants IMMIG National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Resident population with foreign nationality/ 
  Total resident population in the municipality 
  Percentage of families 
CHILDREN_3 National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Total families with more than 3 children / 
   with more than 3 children Total number of families 
Municipal 
quality of life 
Average Building Age BUILD National Institute of Statistics 2001 Weighted average age of the buildings 
Municipal  Abstention Rate VOTE National Elections Commission 2005 Abstention rate in local government elections in 2005 
Social Capital  Percentage of recycle    
RECY National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Recycle residues in the municipality (KG)/ 
  residues per resident Resident population in the municipality (hab)  
  
Teacher/pupil ratio per NUTIII TEACHERS National Institute of Statistics 2001 
Total number of 3rd cycle and secondary teachers/ 
  Total number of 3rd cycle and secondary students 
School 
Number of exams EXAMS Ministry of Education 
2005-
2010 
  
Public school (dummy) PUB Ministry of Education 
2005-
2010 
Equals  1 if the school is Public and equals 0 otherwise 
Private school financed   
PFPRIV Ministry of Education 
2005-
2010 
Equals  1 if the school is  a State-funded Private school 
by the Government (dummy) and equals  0 otherwise 
Percentage of girls  GIRLS Ministry of Education 
2005-
2010 
Percentage of girls in  9th grade exams per school 
 
Percentage of students under 16 AGE Ministry of Education 
2005-
2010 
Percentage of students under 16 
 
in 9th grade exams per school 
Table 7: Variable description and sources 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for 2005 exams data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Regressions in Mathematics and Portuguese exams in 2005 as dependent variables, and the 
average of the five years.  
 
 
 
 
        VOTE        1237    .3858836    .0820109       .177       .537
       BUILD        1237    34.82402    8.032932      18.93      56.51
                                                                      
  children_3        1237    .0986385    .0340156   .0492578   .3180934
         DEN        1237    937.4221    1491.628        5.8     7379.7
        MONO        1237    .1128868    .0258757        .06       .226
       IMMIG        1237     .021658    .0201404      .0018      .0948
     AVERAGE        1237    39.34856    3.337227      30.66      52.71
                                                                      
         OLD        1237    .1732215    .0570454       .085       .406
        MONU        1207    .0002881    .0002424   .0000867    .001394
      EXPCUL        1237    1.880988    13.27395   .0112012   116.5287
       ratio        1234    .1489322    .2396707          0          1
      COMPET        1237    125.6055    84.58746         23        254
                                                                      
       ITTIT        1237    .0957456     .049728      .0375       .321
        DROP        1237    .0261941    .0133237          0      .0953
        MAND        1237    .3704771    .1244281      .1272      .6403
        HIGH        1237    .0842196    .0547534      .0144      .2267
        UNEM        1237    .0687486    .0207262       .025       .221
                                                                      
         PPP        1237    3.157754    8.613211       .009     36.105
         INC        1237    792.4614    175.8695      521.9     1487.3
          PP        1237    95.26152    31.52398      47.25     173.33
    TEACHERS        1237    .0503278    .0054209   .0367354   .0617324
      GENDER        1237     .537732    .1095078          0          1
                                                                      
         AGE        1237    .9072557     .085702   .1818182          1
      PFPRIV        1237    .0622474     .241702          0          1
         PUB        1237    .8415521    .3653081          0          1
       EXAMS        1237     127.118    76.52066          8        569
      GRADES        1237    2.636029    .3098439   1.794118      4.125
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
                              
           F    55.701022     
          r2    .59448051     
           N          548     
          df                  
                              
       _cons    .90045933***  
     PFPRIV_   -.17388571**   
         PUB   -.28747629***  
  Children_3   -.82590915*    
       IMMIG   -.61077915     
        DROP   -2.2974975**   
        HIGH    .72775581***  
         AGE    2.5099843***  
       EXAMS    .00012103     
                              
    Variable     FIVEYEARS    
                              
         legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
                                
           F     64.96841       60.776974  
          r2    .37723583       .32426248   
           N         1237       1237  
          df                      
                                
       _cons    1.1624937***    2.2248254***
  children_3   -.57104367*     -.62517134*  
       IMMIG   -2.1970829***   -.74209285*  
        DROP   -2.9449184***   -1.1023289   
        HIGH    .80182191***    .86678747***
         AGE    1.6395257***    1.1634295***
      PFPRIV   -.28086937***   -.15609305***
         PUB   -.43413586***   -.24996138***
       EXAMS    .00038439**     .0003315***
                                
    Variable        MAT         PORT     
                                
1 
 
                         legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
                                                              
           F    29.878027       48.872818       50.056554     
          r2    .28573005       .41509719       .40580714     
           N         1237            1237            1237     
          df                                                  
                                                              
     MADEIRA   -.11017223      -.00024734      -.00543398     
     ALGARVE   -.08440663      -.13327069***   -.17309628***  
    ALENTEJO    .00497683      -.02641178      -.04406674     
      LISBOA   -.12296487***   -.11137351***   -.10362317***  
       NORTE   -.08601452***   -.06123517**    -.07701962***  
  children_3   -1.0127677***   -.74386471**    -.75454246**   
    TEACHERS                     2.767241                     
        HIGH    1.6962565***    1.0402923***                  
          PP                                    .00161526***  
         AGE                    1.4157723***    1.4034093***  
      PFPRIV    -.3492913***    -.2393771***   -.24151051***  
         PUB   -.43036696***   -.35063798***   -.36105406***  
       EXAMS    .00068789***    .00044211***    .00038705***  
                                                              
    Variable       reg8            reg9            reg11      
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Regressions with the regions dummies 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.014194   .0327464    30.97   0.000     .9499486    1.078439
    TEACHERS    -1.445482   .4927148    -2.93   0.003    -2.412138   -.4788257
      GENDER     .0581188   .0215528     2.70   0.007     .0158343    .1004033
      COMPET      .000055   .0000324     1.70   0.090    -8.60e-06    .0001186
     FILHO_3     -.448155   .0756578    -5.92   0.000    -.5965878   -.2997222
       IMMIG    -.4309902   .1355414    -3.18   0.002    -.6969085   -.1650718
      PFPRIV    -.0598951   .0123215    -4.86   0.000    -.0840686   -.0357216
         PUB    -.0500405   .0082806    -6.04   0.000    -.0662862   -.0337947
       EXAMS     .0002126   .0000316     6.74   0.000     .0001507    .0002746
                                                                              
         AGE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    9.07820597  1236  .007344827           Root MSE      =  .08162
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0931
    Residual    8.18013801  1228   .00666135           R-squared     =  0.0989
       Model    .898067963     8  .112258495           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  1228) =   16.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1237
. . regress AGE EXAMS PUB PFPRIV IMMIG FILHO_3 COMPET GENDER TEACHERS
Table 12: Regressions with age as dependant variable 
       RATIO        1237    1.000178    .0896985   .6984071   1.407005
      GRADES        1237    2.636029    .3098439   1.794118      4.125
expected_g~s        1237    2.636029    .1972461   1.586908   3.291654
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Table 13: Summary Statistics of School adjusted score ratio 
Expected Grades 
 
 
 
  
Ranking School Description Municipality Region  School 
Type 
Average School 
Score 
Expected Average 
Score 
Ratio 
1228 504063 Externato Nacional de Moscavide Lisboa Lisboa priv 3,136 2,400 0,765 
1229 341174 Escola Básica dos 2º e 3º Ciclos de Dr. Joaquim de Barros Oeiras Lisboa pub 2,589 1,977 0,764 
1230 950013 Colégio Jardim das Cores I Vila do Conde norte priv 2,855 2,176 0,762 
1231 380078 Colégio Nossa Senhora da Conceição Lisboa Lisboa priv 3,028 2,304 0,761 
1232 380181 Colégio D. Maria Pia Lisboa Lisboa priv 3,139 2,278 0,726 
1233 344047 Escola Básica dos 2º e 3º Ciclos de Miragaia Porto norte pub 2,787 2,000 0,718 
1234 380079 Colégio D. Nuno Álvares Pereira Lisboa Lisboa priv 3,057 2,188 0,715 
1235 380826 Colégio Sociedade  Benef. A Voz do Operário Lisboa Lisboa priv 3,146 2,250 0,715 
1236 330140 Escola Básica Integrada com Jardim de Infância de Sophia de Mello Brey Oeiras Lisboa pub 2,561 1,794 0,701 
1237 950015 Cooperativa de Ensino Misarelacoop Montalegre norte priv 2,761 1,929 0,698 
 
Ranking School Description Municipality Region  School 
Type 
Average School 
Score 
Expected Average 
Score 
Ratio 
1 390079 Escola Básica com Ensino Secundário de Porto Moniz Porto Moniz Madeira pub 3,096 2,201 1,407 
2 343791 Escola Básica dos 2º e 3º Ciclos de Pinhão Alijó norte pub 3,063 2,250 1,361 
3 404251 Escola Secundária Artística do Conservatório de Música de Calouste Gul Braga norte pub 3,689 2,727 1,353 
4 401961 Escola Secundária com 3º Ciclo de José Estevão Aveiro Centro pub 3,608 2,708 1,332 
5 380358 Escola Inglesa de São Julião Cascais Lisboa pfpriv 3,821 2,875 1,329 
6 506308 Externato Nossa Senhora da Paz Porto norte priv 4,125 3,124 1,321 
7 505961 Externato Escravas Sagrado Coração de Jesus Porto norte priv 3,950 3,134 1,260 
8 340935 Escola Básica dos 2º e 3º Ciclos de D. Pedro IV (Massamá) Sintra Lisboa pub 3,447 2,741 1,257 
9 340297 Escola Básica dos 2º e 3º Ciclos de Aquilino Ribeiro - Vila Nova de Pa 
Vila Nova de 
Paiva 
Centro pub 3,070 2,450 1,253 
10 400233 Escola Secundária com 3º Ciclo de Gil Eanes Lagos Algarve pub 2,097 1,673 1,253 
Table 14: The top ten schools according to 9
th
 grade exams Ranking based on school adjusted score ratio for 2005 
Table 15: The worst schools according to 9
th
 grade exams Ranking based on school adjusted score ratio for 2005 
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Ranking School Description Municipality Region School Type School Average 
Score 
1228 344047 Escola Básica dos 2º e 3º Ciclos de Miragaia Porto Norte pub 2,000 
1229 330814 Escola Básica Integrada com Jardim de Infância de Monte da Caparica Almada Lisboa pub 2,000 
1230 401663 Escola Secundária com 3º Ciclo de Eça de Queirós (Lisboa) Lisboa Lisboa pub 1,979 
1231 341174 Escola Básica dos 2º e 3º Ciclos de Dr. Joaquim de Barros Oeiras Lisboa pub 1,977 
1232 950015 Cooperativa de Ensino Misarelacoop Montalegre Norte priv 1,929 
1233 330371 Escola Básica Integrada de Apelação Loures Lisboa pub 1,906 
1234 403866 Escola Secundária com 3º Ciclo de Castro Verde Castro Verde Alentejo pub 1,864 
1235 400981 Escola Secundária com 3º Ciclo da Bela Vista Setúbal Lisboa pub 1,818 
1236 401420 Escola Secundária com 3º Ciclo de Dr. Azevedo Neves Amadora Lisboa pub 1,807 
1237 330140 Escola Básica Integrada com Jardim de Infância de Sophia de Mello Brey Oeiras Lisboa pub 1,794 
 
Ranking School Description Municipality Region  School Type School Average 
Score 
1 506308 Externato Nossa Senhora da Paz Porto Norte priv 4,125 
2 505961 Externato Escravas Sagrado Coração de Jesus Porto Norte priv 3,950 
3 380358 Escola Inglesa de São Julião Cascais Lisboa pfpriv 3,821 
4 501062 Colégio Nossa Senhora do Alto Faro Algarve priv 3,773 
5 505810 Colégio Luso - Francês Porto Norte priv 3,692 
6 404251 Escola Secundária Artística do Conservatório de Música de Calouste Gul Braga Norte pub 3,689 
7 502273 Colégio São João de Brito Lisboa Lisboa priv 3,642 
8 504026 Colégio Moderno Lisboa Lisboa priv 3,633 
9 401961 Escola Secundária com 3º Ciclo de José Estevão Aveiro Centro pub 3,608 
10 506060 Colégio Nossa Senhora de Lourdes Porto Norte priv 3,582 
Table 16: The top ten schools according to 9
th
 grade exams Ranking national exams for 2005 
Table 17: The worst schools according to 9
th
 grade exams Ranking based on national exams for 2005 
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Region Norte
       RATIO         432    .9922564    .0880853   .6984071   1.361213
      GRADES         432    2.607871    .2965344   1.928571      4.125
expected_g~s         432    2.628823    .1850553   2.008155   3.188664
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Graph 2 and Table 18: Scatterplot graph and summary statistics for Region Norte 
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Region Centro
       RATIO         326    1.012429    .0862208   .7838026   1.332436
      GRADES         326    2.662818    .2703288   2.017857   3.607843
expected_g~s         326    2.630086    .1420685   2.134557    3.09247
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Graph 3 and Table 19: Scatterplot graph and summary statistics for Region Centro 
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       RATIO         283    .9947678    .0964909   .7005504   1.329278
      GRADES         283    2.694407    .3740867   1.794118   3.821429
expected_g~s         283    2.707535     .247367    1.76129   3.291654
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Graph 4 and Table 20: Scatterplot graph and summary statistics for Region Lisboa 
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       RATIO         109    1.004663    .0795616   .8250698   1.189557
      GRADES         109    2.608982    .2536196   1.863636        3.5
expected_g~s         109    2.597525    .1454622   1.586908   3.005814
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Graph 5 and Table 21: Scatterplot graph and summary statistics for Region Alentejo 
       RATIO          57    .9947741    .0931006   .8165468   1.253425
      GRADES          57    2.520327    .3036533          2   3.772727
          xb          57    2.536486    .2051319   1.672835   3.071462
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Graph 6 and Table 22: Scatterplot graph and summary statistics for Region Algarve 
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       RATIO          30    1.026145    .0985132   .8450949   1.407005
      GRADES          30     2.51778    .3013695     2.0375   3.415254
expected_g~s          30    2.458864    .2436903   2.116873   3.031364
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Graph 7 and Table 23: Scatterplot graph and summary statistics for Region Madeira 
